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Professor Popkin's Foreword places the symposium in the broader setting of recent
literature on statutory interpretation. He briefly reviews the major schools of thought,
explains the contributors' perspectives, and then sets forth his own view on judicial reliance on legislative intent found in legislative history.
WHEN THE JUDGE IS NOT THE PRIMARY
OFFICIAL WITH RESPONSIBILITY TO READ:
AGENCY INTERPRETATION AND THE
PROBLEM OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Peter L. Strauss 321

Professor Strauss examines the problem of statutory interpretation and legislative
history from the particular perspective of the administrative agency. What gives the
problem particular point in that context, he argues, is that an agency already acts in a
matrix of political oversight, and with far greater understanding in fact of the political
history of its constitutive statutes than courts typically enjoy. He examines the possible
implications for political and legal controls over agency action of an approach that would
lock an agency out of its legislative history library. He concludes that such an approach
would tend to strengthen the President in competition with Congress in contemporary
oversight activity; would contribute to Congressional emphasis on oversight rather than
legislation in relation to agency activity; and would diminish the constraints of law as they
may be experienced within the agency itself. He finds particularly disturbing, in this regard, a combination of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision with an approach that abjures the use of legislative history; that combination, in his judgment, would free up
current politics-legislative, executive and judicial-in relation to law, and persuade
agency officials to abandon inquiries into historical understandings that have served until
now as an important element of a rule of law culture.
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In recent years, scholars have applied organization theory to show how administrative agencies may not be as independent of Congress as was traditionally feared in administrative law. Professor Fitts views the Strauss article as showing persuasively how
traditional policy concerns about legislative delegation remain despite these insights, and
that the historical reliance on legislative history in statutory construction can help alleviate some of these difficulties. While agreeing with the Strauss thesis, Fitts suggests there
remain grounds for treating legislative history with some care and skepticism.
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Although the Supreme Court has long relied on legislative history as a guide for
interpreting federal statutes, it has not reflected upon the "value" served by legislative
history. Legal scholars have developed three values that might be served: (1) an authority
value, as evidence of specific legislative intent; (2) a purpose value, as evidence of general
legislative intent; and (3) a truth value, as evidence of a legislative meta-intent. The article critically examines these values in the context of a recent Supreme Court case.
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The problem with legislative history is not so much that committee reports and debates are poor ways to establish 'legislative intent' as it is that 'legislative intent' is not
what courts should try to understand. The central question in statutory construction is
what the legislation means, and not what the legislators meant or intended.
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The article argues that the meaning of the Constitution is determined not only by the
preconceptions of the interpretive community, but also by a set of ethical ideals that follows from the identification of the Constitution as judicially enforced law. The article
then argues, using the equal protection clause as an example, that those ideals, and hence
meanings, would change if the Constitution were identified as a source of higher law
guiding legislators, rather than a source of foundational law mandating judicial
application.
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INTERPRETATION

Professor Marshall discusses statutory interpretation in the contexts of the avoidance
doctrine and the process of judicial review. Arguing that the goal of promoting constitutional dialogue between the governmental branches is not furthered by either practice, he
proposes alternatives for broadening the flow of discourse between Congress and the
Court. Professor Marshall suggests that such congressional stimulation could pave the
way for the legislative body to act as the first bulwark against assaults upon constitutional
rights and values in this age of a decidedly conservative Court.
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